Policing and Skid Row

It has exposed us as a society to some dangerous people; no need to argue about that. People whom we have released have gone out and killed other people, maimed other people, destroyed property; they have done many things of an evil nature without their ability to stop and many of them have immediately thereafter killed themselves. That sounds bad, but let's qualify it. . . . the odds are still in society's favor, even if it doesn't make patients innocent or the guy who is hurt or killed feel any better.

Dr. Andrew Robertson, Deputy Director, California Department of Mental Health

In the New York subway [where broken windows theories were applied in the early 1990s], there were typical theft problems, and police are pretty good at that. But you still have a population that is genuinely and in many respects tragically homeless, the emotionally disturbed, the alcohol and drug abusers. The approach we developed is, have 80-some social workers go out with police to talk this population into decent housing, therapy, drug treatment, etc. In my mind, that is the broken windows approach: Not law enforcement, but to try to get help for this population that is creating disorder in some respects; but it's a pitiful population that needs assistance.

George L. Kelling (2015)

We're human beings, not to be pushed around like cattle. We have a right to be stationary.

Annie Moody (2014)

On October 4, 2002, a document called "Homeless Reduction Strategies"[1] was developed by LAPD's Central Area, which covers Skid Row. The document attempted to look at the demographics of Skid Row and determined "60% of the population to be mentally impaired and 80% to be substance abusers."[2] The document focused on this demographic of the homeless community in Skid Row to draw parallels to earlier LAPD efforts with similar populations— most notably, a concentration of prostitution activities in Hollywood in the 1980s and an increase in homicides in the South Bureau in the early 1990s. The document went on to detail the strategies put in place in Skid Row since the 1980s to limit the homeless population and crime

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[1] LAPD document "Homeless Reduction Strategies: Central Area," October 4, 2002. FI000754
[2] Ibid.

associated with this population in the Central City Area and argued that "without sufficient

personnel resources even the best strategies will be unsuccessful."[3] The new strategy proposed

an intensive effort to address the "criminal homeless" by adopting "anti-camping and anti-public

urination/defecation ordinances" and "disbursement of Social Services providers from within

Central Area. To do this the Central Area LAPD would work with City Council offices, the

Business Improvement Districts, and the City Attorney. The key factor in this document was its

proposal for a "minimum of twenty additional officers deployed, in addition to the existing eight

officers currently assigned to the enforcement of homeless quality of life type issues."

In November, 2002, the Los Angeles Police Department, led by new Chief William

Bratton, "embraced two massive sweeps of Skid Row."[4] The former police chief of New York

City during the 1990s, Bratton's zero-tolerance policy has been credited with reducing petty and

violent crime in that city. Bratton was hired as chief in Los Angeles to transform the fledgling

downtown area by eliminating vestiges of crime and loitering, much like he did in the Times

Square Area of New York. In February, 2003, he announced that he would be implementing a

"broken windows" policing strategy for dealing with three areas of the city, including Skid Row.

By September, 2003, the LAPD was estimating that 50 additional officers would be needed to

enforce a proposed anti-camping ordinance in Skid Row. The resulting strategy would be labeled

"The Safer Cities Initiative."

From 2002 to the spring of 2014, The Safer Cities Initiative transformed the way law

enforcement engaged with downtown Los Angeles and Skid Row, resulting in policies and

practices criminalizing the presence of homeless bodies and their functions and removing

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[3] Ibid.
[4] Blasi, Gary, and The UCLA School of Law Fact Investigation Clinic. "Policing Our Way out of Homelessness?: The First Year of the Safer Cities Initiative on Skid Row." Report Card Policing Homelessness. September 24, 2007. Accessed March 25, 2016. http://lafla.org/pdf/policinghomelessness.pdf.

support systems for this population that enabled them to live in the area. Through increased monitoring, proactive policing, and regular harassment by police officers, Skid Row became the second most policed area, per capita, in the United States.[5]

The Safer Cities Initiative has transformed policing practices in Skid Row from those that focused on containment of crime to those that focus on containment and regulation of bodies. In my many interviews with resident and activists of Skid Row, they note that one of the biggest differences Skid Row today compared to fifteen years ago is the amount of police monitoring the area and arresting residents. This shift reflects a larger national and transnational movement of homeless and urban center policing. The efforts in Skid Row, and now other urban areas, are informed by the crime prevention "success" in New York City in the 1990s, which utilized the broken windows theory and its theory of the correlation of crime with neighborhood disorder. The effect of this has led to the harassment of homeless individuals in Skid Row and highlights the growing surveillance and use of law enforcement to combat not just homelessness but the homeless. This increased effort mirrors a national trend to regulate homeless individuals and their practices. In the last three years, Atlanta, Phoenix, San Diego, Los Angeles, Miami, Oklahoma City, and more than 50 other cities have adopted some kind of anti-camping or anti-food-sharing law.

This chapter provides a historical analysis of the systematic reduction of support services for California's mentally ill residents, the resultant boom in the state's homeless population, and the subsequent criminalization of this population. The broken windows theory of crime has proven to be an enabling metaphor and conceptual framework for these historical developments.

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[5] Venn, Chris. ""Safer Cities Initiative" Creates Most Heavily Policed Area in World   - People's Tribune." Peoples Tribune. September 02, 2015. Accessed March 25, 2016. http://peoplestribune.org/pt-news/2015/09/safer-cities-initiative-creates-most-heavily-policed-area-in-world/.

Homeless people are treated as akin to broken windows or eye sores within particular neighborhoods. Within the visual rhetoric of urban revitalization, the visible presence of homeless people and practices of poverty reduces the "quality of life" index of that neighborhood from the perspective of business people, privileged residents, and tourists. This chapter provides a case study of the Safer Cities Initiative in Los Angeles, which demonstrates how such constructions of the city and its homeless population have enabled the criminalization of publicly visible practices of poverty. The resulting law and order mechanisms developed to police Skid Row have created a de-territorialized system of cyclical incarceration and strict regulation of mobility and immobility beyond prison walls based on petty offenses that are, in practice, survival strategies employed by a population with little to no infrastructural support. Against the prevailing logic that homelessness creates and invites crime in particular neighborhoods, I argue that the criminalization of homelessness must be understood as multivariate historical moments that are rooted in 1960s government-led elimination and defunding of mental hospitals and an increase in rebellions in urban areas and law enforcement's subsequent reaction. I conclude by forecasting where current trends may lead us.

The Roots of Urban Criminality

The following discussion provides a historical analysis of the systematic reduction of support services for California's mentally ill residents and the resultant boom in the state's homeless population. In this section, I describe the neoliberal shift from hospitalization and social services as the predominant models for managing mental illness to law and order strategies for managing the homeless population produced by the privatization of mental health facilities and disinvestment in social services. I argue that homeless criminality does not solely originate

from issues of homelessness. Rather, the criminality of homelessness are multivariate historical moments that are rooted in 1960s government-led elimination and defunding of mental hospitals and an increase in rebellions in urban areas and law enforcement's subsequent reaction.

Beginning in the late 1950s and emerging in the early 1960s, California began to embark on a path of decreased state funding for state health institutions in favor of for-profit models that were argued to provide better, more personal care for patients: "California became the national leader in aggressively moving patients from state hospitals to nursing homes and board-and-care homes, known in other states by names such as group homes, boarding homes, adult care homes, family care homes, assisted living facilities, community residential facilities, adult foster homes, transitional living facilities, and residential care facilities."[6]

The first major endeavor was to reshape the landscape of the mental health system. California became one of the first states in the nation to move care for the mentally ill from state-run institutions to privately run businesses. In 1967, California passed the landmark Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act, which virtually abolished involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill individuals except in extreme cases.[7] By the early 1970s, California had moved most mentally ill patients out of its state hospitals and, by passing LPS, had made it very difficult to get them back into a hospital if they relapsed and needed additional care.[8,9] Nationally, the 1970s saw the beginning of a persistent, marked upswing in national health care expenditures. By the mid-1970s, board-and-care homes, which replaced the old state hospitals, had become big business in

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[6] Torrey, E. Fuller. American Psychosis: How the Federal Government Destroyed the Mental Illness Treatment System. Oxford University Press, 2013.

[7] Gaffney, Adam. "The Neoliberal Turn in American Health Care." *International Journal of Health Services* 45, no. 1 (January 2015): 33-52.

[8] Ibid. pg. 96.

[9] Qadeer, Imrana. "Universal Health Care: The Trojan Horse of Neoliberal Policies." *Social Change* 43, no. 2 (2013): 149-64.

California. In Los Angeles alone, there were over 11,000 ex-state-hospital patients living in board-and-care facilities.[10]

Many of the board-and-care homes in California were clustered in city areas that were rundown and thus had low rents. Many of these homes were poorly run and had substandard living conditions. In addition to the poor conditions of these homes, community residents were complaining that their towns was becoming "psychiatric ghettos."[11] These psychiatric ghettos are the early model of the service-center ghettos of the 1980s. Psychiatric ghettos sprung up in declining residential and tourist areas in boarding homes that were formerly tourist-based hotels that had become dilapidated. In many cases, these homes were tinder for large-scale fires. These homes could not meet the stringent fire regulations under federal legislation and suffered fires due to faulty electrical wiring. The aforementioned article details numerous severe fires and deaths of these patients that were caused by the lack of enforcement and investment in safety. Many of these boarding homes were merely packed money-making chicken coops, with mentally ill and elderly patients being the confined chickens waiting for their death. Concerns about safety expanded from the home and into the streets as many of the patients would wander out of their homes and into the communities. To combat the influx of patients wandering city streets, law enforcement began to increasingly arrest this population (regulation of fire safety at these boarding homes was still not enforced). In "The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior," Marc Abramson[12] (1972) claimed that because the new LPS statute made it difficult

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[10] Mayberg, Stephen. *The Mental Health Services Act: An Important Step Towards Transformation.* Report. May 2004. http://histpubmh.semel.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/story-flipbooks/MHSA_and_Transformation/files/mhsa_and_transformation.pdf.
[11] Gargan, Edward A. "As 'Psychiatric Ghettos,' Boarding Homes Get More Dangerous." *New York Times*, February 08, 1981.
[12] Abramson, Marc F. "The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior." *PS Psychiatric Services* 23, no. 4 (1972): 101-05.

to get patients admitted to a psychiatric hospital, police "regard arrest and booking into jail as a more reliable way of securing involuntary detention of mentally disordered persons." Abramson was the first to coin the term "criminalization of the mentally ill;" he observed that persons with mental disorders who engaged in minor crimes were increasingly subject to arrest and prosecution in a county jail system.

By the mid-1970s, some states suggested that about 5% of jail inmates were seriously mentally ill. In California county jails, 6.7% of the inmates were psychotic. In the mid-70s there were several high profile cases of former mental patients who would go on and commit murder.[13] These cases, in addition to growing crime in newly populated urban centers in major cities of California, led to an increase in fear of crime. This fear came from suburbanites who feared the mentally ill and the poor black and Latino populations of the inner city. To combat this fear and, in reality, to combat these populations' occupation of once predominately white middle-class spaces, California became tough on crime in order to regain an assumed social order.

Essential to any discussion of social order is the concern over disorder and its connection to fear of crime. A number of studies turned to disorder to explain fear of crime. For example, Richard Moran and James Q. Wilson[14] (1976) first noted that people were troubled not only by crime: "the daily hassles they are confronted with on the street—street people, panhandlers, rowdy youths, or 'hey honey' hassles—and the deteriorated conditions that surround them— trash strewn alleys and vacant lots, graffiti, and deteriorated or abandoned housing—inspire

[13] Torrey, E. Fuller, Aaron D. Kennard, Don Eslinger, Richard Lamb, and James Pavle. "More Mentally Ill Persons Are in Jails and Prisons than Hospitals: A Survey of the States" Treatment Advocacy Center. May 2010. Accessed March 25, 2016. https://www.saferfoundation.org/files/documents/final_jails_v_hospitals_study.pdf.

[14] Moran, Richard, and James Q. Wilson. "Thinking about Crime." *Contemporary Sociology* 5, no. 4 (1976): 413.

concern."[15] The urban center, with its poor people and people of color, represented a place of fear for white citizens. An extension of this research is seen with Garofalo[16] (1981) who states that "fear of crime" is not simply fear of crime but is tied to fear for quality of life and concern for the community. Disorder affects both fear of crime and actual crime through a process in which disorder signals to residents that local controls have failed and causes them to become personally at risk of victimization. An increase in disorder would lead to an increase in crime that would, in turn, increase fear.[17]

To appease this growing concern, in 1976 Governor Jerry Brown and the California Legislature passed a series of laws creating the state's determinate sentencing structure. Over the next 30 years, a tough-on-crime mindset drove legislators and voters to lengthen sentences and reduce opportunities for parole, resulting in a prison system packed to more than 200 percent of its design capacity.[18] While the prison population was increasing, the homeless population comprised of chronically mentally ill patients followed. In 1988, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) issued estimates of where patients with chronic mental illness were living. Approximately 120,000 were said to be still hospitalized; 381,000 were in nursing homes; between 175,000 and 300,000 were living in board-and-care homes; and between 125,000 and

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[15] Ibid. pg. 66

[16] Garofalo, James. "The Fear of Crime: Causes and Consequences." *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-1981)* 72, no. 2 (Summer 1981): 839.

[17] Hinkle, Joshua Conard. "Making Sense of Broken Windows the Relationship between Perceptions of Disorder, Fear of Crime, Collective Efficacy and Perceptions of Crime." PhD diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2009.

[18] Lawrence, Sarah. "Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing and Managing Risk in the Post-Realignment Era: A Paper for the Executive Session on Public Safety Realignment | Stanford Law School." Stanford Law School. 2013. Accessed March 25, 2016. https://law.stanford.edu/publications/managing-jail-populations-to-enhance-public-safety-assessing-and-managing-risk-in-the-post-realignment-era-a-paper-for-the-executive-session-on-public-safety-realignment/.

300,000 were thought to be homeless.[19] The police strategy of arresting mentally ill patients continued through this time.

In addition to changing the structure of correctional facilities, the economy of the era was undergoing a dramatic shift. In the 1970s, California witnessed population growth leading to an increase housing demand. This growth occurred in the midst of national economic turmoil and state inflation. Long-time California white residents, many of whom resided in the suburbs and communities outside of the big cities, began to complain about the amount of taxpayer money being sent to the urban centers and wanted a disinvestment in those areas and an increased investment into the new decentralized economic power bases. In 1978, California voters passed Proposition 13. The proposition decreased property taxes by assessing property values at their 1975 value and restricted annual increases of assessed value of real property to an inflation factor not to exceed 2% per year.[20] The result of this proposition strengthened local municipalities with high homeowner rates but left cities to fend for themselves.

1980s law enforcement in Los Angeles was defined by the "War on Drugs," attempts to curtail gang activity and the subsequent LAPD strategy "Operation Hammer" that was used to engage in these urban battles, resulting in widespread police brutality that continues to plague the department. Operation Hammer originated during the 1984 Olympic Games held in Los Angeles. The operation consisted of large-scale gang sweeps in South Central and East Los Angeles.[21] Los Angeles was being billed as a model global city, but the growing gang population and urban economic plight and blight threatened to undermine this. Suspected and known gang members

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[19] Petersilia, Joan. "California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal Justice Systems." *Harvard Law & Policy Review* 8 (May 2014): 801-39. http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/183091/doc/slspublic/Petersilia Harvard AB 109 Proof.pdf.

[20] Myers, Dowell, "The Demographics of Proposition 13," Population Dynamics Research Group, USC School of Policy, Planning & Development (September 2009).

[21] Spohn, Cassia. "Race, Crime, and Punishment in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries." *Crime and Justice* 44, no. 1 (September 2015): 49-97.

were taken into custody and held for the remainder of the Olympics. No actual charges were filed against those arrested.

Operation Hammer continued after the Olympics. Under LAPD Police Chief Daryl Gates, military-style operations with battering rams, full SWAT units, and tear gas targeted alleged homes of drug dealers and gang members under Operation Hammer. Operation Hammer lasted until 1990, resulting in over 50,000 people arrested in raids and only 60 felony convictions. Almost all who were arrested were young black and Latino men and women. Police brutality complaints in this era were up 30 percent from the previous five-year period.[22] It is not hard to argue that Operation Hammer and LAPD tactics during this time period were gross and negligent racial profiling meant to impose a police state of fear and violence for inner city Los Angeles residents. During this time period the LAPD was known for limited engagement with the community aside from enforcement activities. The mentally ill, homeless, black and Latino youth, and drug addicts became "social ills" during the 1980s that tough-on-crime rhetoric and policies attempted to eradicate. This climate of police brutality, poverty, and isolation would serve as the embers that would kindle the fire that was the LA Riots in 1992.[23]

After the riots, civil unrest remained in the forefront of discourse about the city and influenced a continuation of the tough-on-crime rhetoric that defined 1980s California politics. Urban areas were considered powder kegs that needed to be controlled. In 1994, California passed Proposition 184, the "Three Strikes and You're Out" law.[24] California voters passed the strictest three strikes sentencing law in the nation. It doubled the penalty for a second felony if

[22] Cockburn, Alexander, and Jeffrey St. Clair. *Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs, and the Press*. Verso, 1999.
[23] Callinicos, Alex. *Marxism and the New Imperialism*. London: Bookmarks, 1994.
[24] Pillsbury, Samuel H. "A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California's Three Strikes Law." *Buffalo Criminal Law Review* 6, no. 483 (2002).

the first one was serious or violent. The so-called third strike carries a mandatory prison sentence of 25 years to life. About two dozen states have similar laws. But only California counts any felony as a third strike, not just a serious or violent one.[25] The proposition gained momentum after two highly-publicized cases. In June of 1992, Kimber Reynolds was leaving a popular local restaurant when Joe Davis and Douglas Walker came by on a motorbike and tried to grab her purse. When she refused, Joe Davis pulled out a .357 Magnum and shot her.[26] The men responsible for Kimber's murder were both repeat offenders. Polly Klaas, from Petaluma, California, was kidnapped from a slumber party about a year and a half after Kimber Reynolds' murder. The Klaas family used television and the Internet to keep Polly's story in the news as authorities continued their search. Two months after her disappearance, the police announced the arrest of Richard Allen Davis. Davis was eventually charged with and convicted of raping and murdering 12-year-old Polly.[27] All three men were repeat felons.

State politicians, with the assistance of Kimber's father, pushed for harsher sentences for repeat offenders, leading to the passing of Proposition 184.[28] The "repeat felon" became a class of people that would remain under constant detention and/or surveillance. A "strike" sentence could be triggered by any felony conviction—even for a nonviolent offense. As a result, strikers were given lengthy or life sentences after convictions for things like receiving stolen property and simple possession of a controlled substance. This led to a boom of inmates in California prisons.

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[25] Romano, Michael. "Divining the Spirit of California's Three Strikes Law." *Federal Sentencing Reporter* 22, no. 3 (February 2010): 171-75.

[26] Jaffe, Ina. "Two Torn Families Show Flip Side of 3 Strikes Law." NPR. October 28, 2009. Accessed March 25, 2016. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114219922.

[27] Mills, David, and Michael Romano. "The Passage and Implementation of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36)." *Federal Sentencing Reporter* 25, no. 4 (February 2013): 265-70.

[28] Domanick, Joe. "Prisoners of Panic." *Los Angeles Times*, January 06, 2008.

In the aftermath of the riots, Daryl Gates stepped down as police chief and was replaced by Willie Williams, the first African-American police commissioner in LAPD history. Williams' regime is of note for its attempt to reintegrate itself within the African-American and Latino communities. Contrary to the public's opinion of Williams, the Los Angeles Police Commission declined to renew his contract, citing Williams' failure to fulfill his mandate to create meaningful change in the department after the riots. Williams was replaced by Bernard Parks. Parks' regime came amidst a national and state economic recovery. In addition to this, crime went down significantly as the gang truce from the mid-1990s began to ease tensions between rival south-central Los Angeles gangs.[29] Parks oversaw a significant drop in violent crime throughout the city, especially in South Central LA.

Parks advocated for a form of informal social control in local communities that strayed away from the overt and often violent police presence that defined the LAPD in previous eras, a strategy that allowed communities in Los Angeles to take part in controlling their own communities through outreach events and mentoring programs. Informal social control is defined by Sampson et al.[30] (1997) as "informal mechanisms by which residents themselves achieve public order." This type of social control does not operate through the techniques of regulation or formal institutions but is articulated through informal surveillance strategies by community members and interpersonal interactions that act to deter undesirable behaviors. Examples of this could be talking to young children who may be "roughhousing" or confronting a group of teens who are loud or bothering a shopkeeper. This informal social control is concerned with visible

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[29] Stoltze, Frank. "Historic 1992 Watts Gang Truce - Bigger than the LA Riots?" Southern California Public Radio. February 28, 2012. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.scpr.org/news/2012/04/28/32221/forget-la-riots-1992-gang-truce-was-big-news/.

[30] Sampson, R. J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." *Science* 277, no. 5328 (1997): 918-24.

signs of social disorder. Sampson et al. argue that informal social control is an important

mechanism for neighborhoods to deter crime because collective efficacy can mediate residential

stability in the face of socioeconomic conditions. In their study of a Chicago neighborhood, they

found that informal social control can limit the rates of violence in a community and provide

informal structures of social welfare for its community members. Sampson et al. argue that

neighborhoods with high concentrations of population, heterogeneity, and poverty

are susceptible to high rates of delinquency and crime. Informal social control may be a

mechanism to explain why some high-concentrated areas have higher crime rates than others.

Eventually, Parks' regime would come to an end due to a police brutality scandal

involving the Rampart Division. Officers in the anti-gang "CRASH" unit "framed innocent

individuals by planting evidence and committing perjury to gain convictions. Innocent men and

women pleaded guilty to crimes they did not commit and were convicted by juries because of the

fabricated cases against them. Many individuals for subjected to excessive police force and

suffered very serious injuries as a result."[31] Parks attempted to clean up the division, but lack of

support from fellow officers and politicians led to Parks not being recommended for

reappointment.

In 2002, the city of Los Angeles and new mayor James Hahn looked outside the

department for a hire that could turn public and political sentiment about the department. In

addition, violent crime was starting to increase, reversing a trend that had begun in the mid-

1990s. Hanh was given three choices by the Los Angeles Police Commission and decided on

former New York Chief of Police William Bratton. As the NYPD's commissioner, Bratton

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[31] Chemerinsky, Erwin. "An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal." Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. January 01, 2001. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2262&context=llr.

presided over a crime drop while developing the department's computerized crime-tracking system. By the time he resigned in 1996, he was lauded as one of the most influential police chiefs in the world. Bratton resigned in the midst of growing conflict with Mayor Rudy Giuliani over who deserved credit for the turnaround in crime for New York City and due to a minor scandal for a book deal that he signed while in office as well as accepting multiple unauthorized trips from corporations and individuals. Bratton was working as a consultant for Kroll Associates, a private consulting firm that specializes in computer forensics, corporate investigations, and risk assessments that was in charge of auditing the LAPD after the federal consent decree that was ordered after the Rampart scandal.

One of the first things Bratton did as Chief was to focus on changing police involvement in several key areas in Los Angeles: Hollywood, Baldwin Village, the San Fernando Valley, MacArthur Park, Downtown, and Skid Row.[32] In the fall of 2003, several meetings took place to develop the new policing strategy for the downtown area. These meetings reveal that an intentional public relations campaign led and framed policy changes. Ultimately, the city of Los Angeles, the LAPD, and the local business community decided they wanted to do a street sweeping campaign and, as part of this campaign, remove the available support services for the homeless community, and most that remained were operated through programs dictated by the LAPD. In Blasi's analysis of the effectiveness of the broken windows policing strategy in Los Angeles, *Policing Our Way out of Homelessness: The First Year of Safer Cities Initiative in Skid Row*, they note that within these initial meetings conversation regarding housing and services to reduce homelessness was never addressed, but the issue of homeless practices as criminal

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[32] Buntin, John. "The LAPD Remade." City Journal. January 23, 2015. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_1_william-bratton.html.

activities drove much of the dialogue. In the October 3rd, 2003 meeting, Blasi notes that the framing of the new anti-homeless ordinances focused on creating "moral arguments [that] needed to be developed from every point of view: health concerns, child safety, etc."[33]

In the November 6, 2003 meeting, the press liaisons from the different agencies met to "develop a coordinated strategy for communication to the press regarding the forthcoming effort in Skid Row" and developing the "message of the effort." The problems of Skid Row shifted from efforts to address criminal activity, or even the causes and criminal activity that result from homelessness, and instead shifted any action of the homeless population as proof of the lawlessness of this population. Blasi and Wolch assert that "there was no discussion at the meeting about lawlessness other than violations that inevitably accompany homelessness in the absence of adequate shelter or other facilities: sleeping or sitting on the sidewalk, conducting biological functions in locations other than bathrooms. Rather, the focus was entirely on discouraging visible homelessness in Skid Row. For example, the second item on the agenda addressed whether the sidewalks in Skid Row could be narrowed to make sidewalk dwelling more difficult."[34] The activities of the homeless population were equated with disorder and lawlessness. Homelessness and the visibility, actions, and aesthetics of homelessness became the focus of the LAPD in Skid Row by way of enforcement of "quality of life" laws and policies.

Broken Windows

This section articulates the construction of homeless populations as representations of the broken window in the metaphor of "broken windows." Their existence and practices are explicitly linked to crime and lack of control. By controlling the bodies and practices of the

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[33] Ibid. pg. 26.
[34] Ibid. pg. 27.

homeless community, law enforcement is able to control and regulate a community. I argue that the focus on Skid Row as the primary site of crime in Los Angeles is on-site-based efforts of policing can be defined as the criminology of place. This is a place-based strategy of criminalization and policing. It is about how an area *looks* from a particular perspective. Since the problem is articulated as a visual problem or eye sore, the remedy is also visual. Enforcement is of visual cues of unrest, attempts to make these bodies and practices disappear via soft policing techniques such as issuing citations or redesigning the space by narrowing sidewalks. "Quality of life" is aesthetic. It is about how the neighborhood looks, and by constituting an eye sore the homeless community and their encampments and practices are spoiling the urban landscape and its views for privileged business owners, residents, and visitors to the city. Broken windows theory is a crime prevention strategy aimed at curtailing neglect and signs of neglect, but it gets marshaled on Skid Row in a way that promotes the neglect.

Skid Row, once the dumping ground for this population, became a site where this population was corralled and delivered to the State Corrections system. What resulted in Skid Row was the creation of a system of cyclical incarceration. This system would become self-serving as officers of the Safer Cities Initiative wrote thousands of citations in Skid Row for every imaginable infraction, including citations for "littering" upon the dropping of a cigarette ash that would be ignored elsewhere in the City. The Safer Cities Initiative represents a transformation in law enforcement practices from an occupation model exemplified during the Daryl Gates era of policing to a neoliberal model of surveillance and detention. A cycle of 'presence-containment-addressed delinquency-incarceration-re-placement' is performed in Skid Row. This cycle is manifested not just legally but on the bodies of the residents as a form of

control of the subaltern[35] through urbanization, in which these subaltern bodies are controlled due to their nonconformity with the revanchist city. Due to these processes, Skid Row becomes an expanded space of state detention, or what I describe as regulatory mechanisms for controlling the mobility of different populations. It's the whole premise of this Safer Cities Initiative to invest enormous police resources into very, very petty things that are really a consequence of someone's illness or a consequence of having to survive on the streets."[36] It is a cyclical street sweeping campaign in which the police making arrests are the street sweepers, and the homeless are the trash.

The initial planning meetings for the Safer Cities Initiative in Skid Row only discussed "crimes" that arise directly out of homelessness. As discussed in Chapter 3, lack of services provided by the city of Los Angeles in the 1990s and early 2000s directly led to an absence of available shelter or facilities, which in turn led to "criminal behavior" like sleeping or "camping" on the sidewalk.

Blasi notes[37] that as the broken windows theory came to be applied to Skid Row after the 2003 holiday season, the vast majority of arrests were for sitting or lying on the sidewalk, a violation of Section 41.18(d) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code.[38] The broken windows theory of crime posits a connection between neighborhood disorder and serious crime. In their seminal article of a New Jersey neighborhood "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,"

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[35] Lawson, Victoria A. *Making Development Geography*. London: Hodder Arnold, 2007.
[36] Personal Interview with Skid Row resident conducted March 2012
[37] Blasi, pg.32.
[38] No person shall sit, lie or sleep in or upon any street, sidewalk or other public way. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to persons sitting on the curb portion of any sidewalk or street while attending or viewing any parade… nor…to persons sitting upon benches or other seating facilities provided for such purpose by municipal authority.

Wilson and Kelling[39] (1982) argue that signs of physical and social disorder such as public drunkenness, rowdy teen gangs, trash, and broken windows lead members of these communities to fear and withdraw from local community and neighborhood spaces. In turn this withdrawal from the community leads to less informal social controls that act as barriers to delinquency and crime.

According to broken windows theory, an unrepaired window is a signal that individuals in the neighborhood or a property owners do not care about their livable surroundings, so breaking more windows will not be met with any opposition. A broken window can be the locus of community abandonment and despair; when there is a piece of property that is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in, etc. Eventually, fights will occur, panhandlers will accost strangers, and serious crime will flourish. Emotional disinvestment leads to financial disinvestment. Wilson and Kelling frame the broken window as a slippery slope of actions that will eventually lead to disorder and violence.

In terms of law enforcement's connection to this process, it begins with disorder not being dealt with in a timely manner. Trash is not picked up; loiterers are not asked to move on. In time this invites more trash being thrown in the vacant lot, more loiterers to gather, and more people to start drinking in public. As this disorder accumulates, it sends a message to residents that things are getting out of control and that social controls have failed in their neighborhood. The key here is that residents perceive untended disorder. It will likely have little impact if residents are not aware of the disorder in the community. In turn, Wilson and Kelling suggest

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[39] Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." The Atlantic. March 1982. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.

that residents who perceive worsening disorder problems eventually become fearful and begin to withdraw from the community. They spend less time outside, become less likely to intervene and ward off disorderly people, and, in the extreme, "good" residents may move away. The net effect is a lowering of informal social controls, which leads to more and more disorder and minor crimes occurring as people perceive that they can get away with such behavior in these areas where they routinely see disorderly behavior going unpunished.

In time, criminals also take these signs of untended disorder as a cue that such a neighborhood is a good place for them to work with relative impunity. In Wilson and Kelling's terms, such neighborhoods are vulnerable to criminal invasion. It is not inevitable, but such places are much more likely, in their view, to see an increase in crime than neighborhoods that exert control in regulating the occurrence of disorder. Once crime occurs, residents also notice this and the cycle of fear and withdrawal is likely to worsen.[40] Police can fight crime more effectively by dealing with disorder. If they stop disorder from accumulating and prevent neighborhoods from reaching the tipping point where they become vulnerable for criminal invasion, they can have a great impact on crime. Wilson and Kelling's broken windows usage as a metaphor and theory is directly influenced by a social psychological experiment conducted by Stanford psychologist Philip Zimbardo in 1969. Zimbardo abandoned a car with its hood up in two places—in the Bronx in New York City and on the Stanford Campus in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was vandalized within 10 minutes, and within 24 hours everything of value was removed. The car in Palo Alto, however, was not touched for more than a week. Zimbardo then smashed the windshield with a sledgehammer, and from that point on,

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[40] Skogan, Wesley G. "Broken Windows: Whyand Howwe Should Take Them Seriously." *Criminology & Public Policy* 7, no. 2 (May 21, 2008): 195-201.

people passing by saw the activity and the damaged car and joined in the destruction. Just as the broken window on the car in Palo Alto invited more vandalism, untended disorder is a visual cue in a community that invites more disorder and eventually more serious crime.

Since the publication of the original broken windows article, the theory has been utilized to inform police practices in the United States. This proliferation of its usage is tied to Chief Bratton publicly endorsing the method and its effectiveness in New York City in the 1990s. New York Law Enforcement and broken windows proponents cited figures that showed that crime decreased dramatically during this period and broken windows policing was the method that led to these results.[41] Broken windows-based policing was a central focus of the efforts of police commissioner William Bratton and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to clean up the city. Studies[42] estimate that one violent crime was prevented for every 28 misdemeanor arrests in NYC from 1989-1998. As such, the increase in misdemeanor arrests as part of the broken windows policing program was estimated to have averted more than 60,000 violent crimes.

In January, 2003, LAPD presented 135 cases of 41.18(d) violations to the City Attorney, whose office prosecuted 116. "Quality of life" laws were strictly enforced in the downtown area. The term "quality-of-life" policing was first used in New York City in the early 90s, during the Giuliani-Bratton administration. It refers to the practice of heavily policing a number of normally non-criminal activities such as standing, congregating, sleeping, eating, and/or drinking in public spaces, as well as minor offenses such as graffiti, public urination, panhandling, littering, and unlicensed street vending.[43]

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[41] Bratton, William J., and Peter Knobler. *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic*. New York: Random House, 1998.

[42] Colin Campbell, New York a Blueprint for Cutting Atlanta Crime, Atlanta J-Const 5F (Dec 23, 2001) (citing the Kelling and Sousa study in discussing the reasons for the decline in New York's crime rate during the 1990s and the lessons that Atlanta should take away from the New York experience as it addresses its rising crime rate).

[43] Harcourt, Bernard E. *Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

One of the key features in the Safer Cities Initiative proposed to the general public was the increase in services for the homeless population. The initiative's aggressive policing was supposed to be offset by a focus on eliminating the causes of homelessness. In 2006, before the Safer Cities Initiative (SCI) was fully implemented, a Mayor's Press Release announced the impending launch of the 50-officer effort and spoke of targeting crime "while also leading homeless individuals to housing and services" and "expanding the 'Streets or Services' program" operated by the City Attorney." While much lip service was paid to the services part, no actual money was put into developing these services; all of the money went into the policing. The cost to the General Fund of 50 police officers for the first year of SCI was approximately $6 million, with $175,000 to pay for one Deputy City Attorney and a paralegal due to the increase of cases but with no funding for housing or services.

This shift from service-based funding to law enforcement-based funding to address issues within the homeless community was developed in a historical context of re-investment in city centers by businesses and developers. By attacking places where crime was occurring, the homeless communities, it was thought that not only crime but the homeless community itself would be curtailed in the city as a whole. Weisburd, Groff, and Yang[44] (2012) state that theories of place assume that crime "is tightly concentrated at 'crime hot spots'; these crime hot spots have strong temporal stability; micro level units of geography are should be emphasized; social and contextual characteristics of places influence crime; and crime at place is predictable." Place, in particular aesthetic landscapes of micro communities, are indicators of potential crimes. By moving away from offender-based justifications of crime patterns and focusing on geographical

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[44] Weisburd, David, Elizabeth Groff, and Sue-Ming Yang. *The Criminology of Place: Street Segments and Our Understanding of the Crime Problem*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

units, crime could be better understood and controlled as situational practices.[45] This new focus

on place has led to new thinking in how environments communicate to communities and

individuals and what types of social and performative practices these environments promote.

This focus on sites of expected and potential criminal activities dictates behavior that law

enforcement police. In his analysis of the impact of broken windows policing in Portland,

Oregon, Heben[46] (2014) states, "The widespread acceptance of this premise marks a drastic shift

from 'servicing' toward 'policing' as a method for managing the issue of homelessness. The

endorsement of the broken windows theory suggests that these informal [tent city] settlements

are robbing a certain degree of quality of life from the surrounding, housed community.

Furthermore, the settlements thwart the efforts by formal design to establish predictable

behavior. As a result, laws and strategies have been adopted to disrupt these acts of necessity,

exiling those without a right to space in the city to an itinerant lifestyle." Broken windows theory

paved the way for the de facto criminalization of the homeless population in Skid Row.

The LAPD's Safer Cities Initiative (SCI) officially launched on Skid Row in the summer

of 2006. Critics of the initiative pointed to the impact in New York City of a similar zero-

tolerance, broken-windows application and noted its historical use to justify law-enforcement

crackdowns on members of marginalized communities—especially poor people of color—who

are disproportionately targeted for petty crimes. Since the summer of 2006, there have been more

than 6,000 arrests in Skid Row, an area with a population of 10,000 to 15,000 people (about

4,000 of whom are homeless) on any given night.[47] More than 100 new officers have been

[45] Sutton, Adam, Adrian Cherney, and Rob White. *Crime Prevention Principles, Perspectives and Practices*. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[46] Heben, Andrew. *Tent City Urbanism: From Self-organized Camps to Tiny House Villages*. Village Collaborative, 2014.
47 Hoffman, Jessica. "Los Angeles Police Are Gentrifying the City's Skid Row -- with Force." Alternet. October 20, 2007. Accessed March 26, 2016.
http://www.alternet.org/story/65481/los_angeles_police_are_gentrifying_the_city's_skid_row_--_with_force.

assigned to the neighborhood in the past nine years. Police officers on foot, in patrol cars, on bicycles, and mounted on horses are a near-constant presence.

Advocates claimed that the Safer Cities Initiative differed from previous policing strategies of containment or disbursement by instituting a three-pronged approach to dealing with the poor quality of life *and* violent crime in Skid Row, claiming that you can't separate one from the other. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, SCI Senior Lead Officer Deon Joseph says, "We started out with enforcement. I'm not going to candy-coat it: We arrested a lot of people, not because they were homeless but because of the high-level of crime. When a celebrity has a drug problem they go to all these great places to get away from their problem. People in Skid Row can't afford that; they have to get clean in a drug bazaar, and the bazaar attracts two types of people: people who need services they can't afford and people more than willing to prey on them, so we had to separate the wolves from the sheep. We wrote a whole lot of tickets and I won't apologize because it saved lives."[48]

Trash and homeless practices were the cause of not only crime but of death in the community. Proponents of SCI focus on the program's approach to enhancement. They claim that the conditions on Skid Row were never clean, and because it *looked* like a dump people thought they could dump things on the streets. It created encampments of contamination that were killing people. The outreach component of SCI offered people drug programs as an alternative to jail. This outreach was essentially officers passing out address cards to the local shelters and, once a month, a group of volunteers following LAPD SCI officers and questioning the Skid Row residents on their housing and drug addiction, followed by handing them an

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48 Arnold, Shayna Rose. "Officer Deon Joseph on the "Heartbreaking" Job of Policing Skid Row - Los Angeles Magazine." Los Angeles Magazine. March 05, 2015. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/officer-deon-joseph-heartbreaking-job-policing-skid-row/.

address card to a local shelter. Unfortunately, SCI officers rarely corresponded with these shelters as many of these shelters were overcrowded and were unable to provide beds to the increase of homeless individuals seeking temporary shelter. Overall, advocates claim that the Safer Cities Initiative lowered crime by 40 percent and reduced deaths by 32 percent. By 2015, the Safer Cities Initiative has added 50 cops to a 1-square-mile area.

Many of these arrests targeted drug addicts and the mentally ill and resulted in a stay in jail followed by release back to the streets. This initial street sweeping campaign resulted in sending a huge influx of homeless addicts to State Prison. If a homeless person receiving a "quality of life" citation does not pay a substantial fine, a warrant is issued for his or her arrest. The next encounter with the police then results in a warrant check and a trip to jail because of the outstanding warrant. Thus, even for those with no drug problems and little chance of being sent to State Prison, the Safer Cities Initiative made Skid Row a very risky place for a homeless person to be.[49] Skid Row becomes a site of security-driven policies that reflect traditional urban fear narratives of city centers.

A neoliberal model of law enforcement where mobility and self-regulation become defining features in securitization. Mountz[50] (2010) argues that "nation states and security agencies deploy rationales of deterrence and securitization" by employing narratives that frame migrants from other borders as security threats. She further asserts that these "rationales link migration and mobility to fear-driven national security policies, converting mobility into regimes of containment, borders into regimes of exclusion."[51] While migrants are the focus for nation-states, low-income residents, and in the case of Skid Row the homeless population, become

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[49] Blasi, pg. 28.
[50] Mountz, Alison. *Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
[51] Ibid. pg. 522.

bodies and identities whose mobilities are restricted due to the threat to public safety that they are made to embody within the urban aesthetics of revitalization. Regulatory mechanisms, detention, and immobilization are the processes used to exclude these populations.

Mountz et. al.[52] (2012) defines detention as "a series of processes; and that operating through these processes are a set of temporal and spatial logics that structure the seemingly paradoxical geographies of detention." For Mountz, detention refers to the ways that nation-state and territorial sovereignty reach beyond national borders while moving into the everyday spaces of migrants that confine them outside of institutional structures (e.g. jails and brick and mortar detention centers). Geographies of detention are paradoxical in the way they produce externalization and internalization of borders that attempt to mark the migrant body. Mountz notes that while "detention works to contain the apparently unknowable migrant, it simultaneously also produces new, highly mobile identities."[53] This process is reflected in the "Bum Blockades" interstate expansion and externalization of Los Angeles borders and the internalization of homeless residents of Skid Row through the spatial practice of not walking to certain areas of the downtown. Thus, detention becomes less about architectural holding pens. Rather, it is engrained in diffuse social practices of immobilization that rely on the policing of social space to control people, objects, and their movement.

Regulatory mechanisms for controlling the mobility of different populations are constructed through a contested set of historical and geographic politics. The space where regulatory mechanisms are situated reflects this contestation. Containing this population in an area where policies are geared to remove this exact population reflects Mountz's argument

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[52] Mountz, Alison, Kate Coddington, R. Tina Catania, and Jenna M. Loyd. "Conceptualizing Detention: Mobility, Containment, Bordering, and Exclusion." *Progress in Human Geography* 37, no. 4 (July 15, 2012): 522-41.
[53] Mountz (2010). pg. 527

regarding the nature of geographies of detention. This form of regulatory control is an expanded carceral geography, a contemporary move away from national and state-run forms of incarceration and boundaries to one that is influenced and constructed by economic and cultural institutions and policed by the state. Regulatory mechanisms are systems of control for keeping a confined space relatively stable and maintained within narrow limits; detection and action are directed to external changes that may alter the space. This project builds upon the work of Mountz on transnational sites of detention on the U.S/Canada border to examine how regulatory control operates in revanchist urban geographies. I move away from Mountz' theorization by looking at not only the way that migrant, or in this case transient residential bodies, reify borders and control but also spatial practices and performances that alter these designated external and internal forms of containment. Skid Row marks a salient site of analysis where this contestation of practices and processes emerge and transform. Urban revitalization is the locus of this new form of spatial identity, the re-creation of boundaries through claims of sovereignty, and the determination of who gets to move through and populate cities. Homeless bodies on Skid Row are deemed criminal and unwanted and therefore are discursively constructed as non-citizens. Homeless people are treated as not having the same rights afforded to full-fledged citizens. The homeless population does have official standing within the legal system and are citizens in that sense, but on the street they are effectively rendered non-citizens because of their criminal status.

Many of the city's probationary programs and drug rehab clinics are placed within Skid Row. When an individual is arrested on Skid Row, they are placed within the legal system and returned to Skid Row with increased limitations on their activities and mobility. The aforementioned Blasi article notes that LAPD's Central Area, including Skid Row, never had the level of serious, violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) found in other

areas like Rampart, Newton, Hollenbeck, or 77th Street. During the first year of SCI, there was a significant decrease in serious crime in Skid Row, but other portions of Central LA–where no additional officers were deployed–had experienced similar declines, and given that very few (less than 1 percent) of the arrests made by the officers assigned to SCI were for serious, violent crimes. In a study conducted to find the effectiveness of the Safer Cities Initiative, it was found that the Safer Cities Initiative did not cause the overall decline in crime in Skid Row, independently of other social, economic, and policing factors at work in LAPD's Central Area more generally.[54] When the types of crime are examined independently, the only statistically significant difference is the decline in robberies in Skid Row, equal to a reduction in one robbery per year for each officer assigned to the Safer Cities Initiative. "There is some reason to believe that the same 50 officers might have had more impact on serious crime in other areas of the City facing a greater crime problem."[55] An example of this can be seen in 2010 when the LAPD launched a crackdown on jaywalking during the holiday season. About 1,000 tickets a month were given to mostly homeless individuals for jaywalking and loitering downtown.

Residents of Skid Row claim that SCI officers are "targeting people who are on the street." A 2013 Los Angeles Times interview with a Skid Row resident details the sentencing consequences of SCI: "If you enter a plea of guilty, they want you to pay money," he says. "And I'm homeless. I don't have the money. So what happens is you fail to appear in court, it turns into a warrant for your arrest. So the next time you get stopped, they can take you to jail right there and then."

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[54] Blasi, pg. 42.
[55] Blasi, Gary. "Did Safer Cities Reduce Crime in Skid Row?" Research Report. September 15, 2008. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://wraphome.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/safer_cities.pdf.

In a study conducted by LA CAN in 2010, it found discriminatory practices of the SCI. Residents were asked to estimate the number of citations they had received since the beginning of SCI in 2006. 122 respondents (55.7%) report receiving a citation. Jaywalking/crosswalk violations (71.7%) are by far the most frequently cited infractions, followed by drinking in public (20.4%), open container (12.4%), and sitting, lying, or sleeping on the sidewalk (12.4%).[56] According to respondents, citations have negative effects beyond the officer abuse, fees, and penalties. As a result of their citations, 31% report losing social services, 26.8% report losing housing, and 16.9% report losing employment. Proponents of Safer Cities often claim that enforcement activities actually benefit poor and homeless people by connecting them to services. When asked if they felt they had benefitted from their citation, 86.6% felt that they had not benefitted.

> Residents were asked to estimate the number of times they had been arrested since the beginning of SCI in 2006. While not all respondents report an arrest, taken as a whole, the average was 2.8 arrests per person. Because these estimates were over the course of four years, it was likely more beneficial to inquire about the number of arrests in the last year. Limiting responses to the last year, 103 respondents (53.6%) report being arrested. This arrest rate is astounding when compared to the 2009 adult arrest rate in California (4.9%) and the 2010 arrest rate in the City of LA (approximately 3.9%). Outstanding warrants were cited as the most frequent reason for arrest (24.4%), with drug possession as the second most arrested offense (18.9%). As a result of their arrest, 51.5% of respondents

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[56] Los Angeles Community Action Network. "Community-Based Human Rights Assessment: Skid Row's Safer Cities Initiative." LA CAN. August 2010. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://cangress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/sci-2010-report-final1.pdf.

report losing housing, 42.4% report losing social services, and 16.4% report

losing employment. Over half (59.1%) of those arrested report physical or verbal

abuse by officers.[57]

The report goes on to detail police harassment in the form of frequent and warrantless

stops and detainments. The majority of respondents (67.2%) confirmed the occurrence of such

practices, reporting a stop/detainment resulting in neither a citation nor arrest. In the last year, the

average number of such stops/detainments was 5.3 per person. During these stops/detainments,

the majority were handcuffed (60.3%), searched (74.6%), background checked (75.4%), or asked

if on probation or parole (76.2%). In the face of this, many people have relocated to other

neighborhoods, farther away from social services. Within 5 years of SCI, there was a decrease of

about 30 percent in the number of people accessing their services. At many homeless service

sites the site's client population has gone from majority black to majority white. Recently,

Downtown LA has seen a rise in people spending the night on local sidewalks. In April 2009,

Central Division officers counted 500 people sleeping on the street in Skid Row. In March of this

year, that number was 1,207.[58] Homelessness in the county has risen 12% in the past two years

drew equal amounts of consternation and outrage. Almost lost in the analysis was the revelation

that the council district that includes Skid Row holds one out of every four homeless individuals

in the city.[59]

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Vaillancourt,, Adam. "LAPD Sends Surge of Officers to Downtown." Los Angeles Downtown News. April 25, 2012. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.ladowntownnews.com/news/lapd-sends-surge-of-officers-to-downtown/article_7b421140-8f1f-11e1-a322-0019bb2963f4.html.

[59] Ford, Dana. "L.A. Declares Emergency on Homelessness." CNN. September 23, 2015. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/22/us/los-angeles-homelessness/index.html.

The new estimate represents a 14% increase from 2013's figure of 5,500 homeless people in the district. The rise in homelessness was attributed to a number of factors, including rising rents, wages that have remained flat or decreased, and a local unemployment level that is above both the state and national average. In the winter of 2014, the Skid Row population began to increase. Amid growing concerns that recent gains in downtown public safety were at risk, the Los Angeles Police Department transferred more than 40 officers to Central Division. The move marks the largest infusion of police resources to Central Division since the Safer Cities Initiative sent 50 additional officers to focus on Skid Row crime in 2006. Officials state they're responding to changing conditions in the area that coincide with a minor uptick in reported crime. They say that relaxed parole regulations and the realignment of low-level felons from state prison to county jail, where incarceration stints are usually shorter, have resulted in more criminals on the street.

Changing Criminality

A changing political and social landscape against criminalization, and specifically incarceration of low level drug convictions, has led to a transformation in California's correctional institutions. A shift to local correctional institutions with limited budgets to curtail a growing homeless population represents a dark future in which practices of poverty now become the most prevalent criminal offenses, with decriminalization efforts continuing for drug offenses. This has impacted Skid Row significantly. In my years conducting this study the amount of people I see on Skid Row has increased dramatically.

In April 2011, the California Legislature and Governor Brown passed a sweeping public safety legislation (Assembly Bill 109) that effectively shifted responsibility for certain

populations of offenders from the state to the counties. The legislation "realigns" from the state to local level responsibility for supervising people convicted of certain felony crimes. This means that thousands of less-serious felony offenders now face at worst jail and out-of-custody supervision (similar to probation), while before they would have been eligible for state prison. Instead of reporting to state parole officers, these offenders are to report to local county probation officers.[60]

AB 109 is fashioned to meet the US Supreme Court Order to reduce the prison population of the State's 33 prisons but was actually brought about by historically inadequate conditions within California prison's health care system. Realignment AB 109 was enacted against the backdrop of a severely overcrowded California state prison system, but the statute says it was enacted to combat recidivism and not because of overcrowding. In November of 2014, Californians overwhelmingly approved Proposition 47. Proposition 47 aims to reduce California's remaining state prison population by reclassifying six current felony crimes as misdemeanors, effectively transferring the cases to the county level. The measure also mandates that money saved from reduced incarcerations go toward funding mental health and substance abuse treatment services, crime prevention programs, and victim services.[61] The state has moved the job of detention and wrap around services to local counties. As we will soon see, this has led many local counties to significantly reduce their jail populations without establishing probationary services due to budget constraints.

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[60] Los Angeles County Probation Department-. "Los Angeles County Probation Department-Adult Services." Los Angeles County Probation Department-Adult Services. 2016. Accessed December 12, 2015. http://probation.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/probation/adult.

[61] Kim, Eddie. "Crime, Punishment, Good Intentions and Skid Row." Los Angeles Downtown News. February 16, 2015. Accessed March 26, 2016. http://www.ladowntownnews.com/news/crime-punishment-good-intentions-and-skid-row/article_97a9b9fc-b3d2-11e4-a555-6b47b72ee774.html.

Proposition 47 is at the forefront of a national trend to reduce harsh criminal penalties that led to an explosion in prison and jail populations beginning in the 1980s. It follows a revision to California's three strikes law that limits the maximum penalty to those whose last offense is serious or violent. Along with the shift of nonviolent inmates from state prison to county jails approved by the state Legislature in 2011, Proposition 47 is expected to further transform California's criminal justice landscape.

Actions to transfer parole violators and lower-level felons to county jails, putting inmates closer to home and potentially improving their prospects for rehabilitation, have impacted county jail populations. As of September 2012, 21 counties had an average daily population greater than their rated capacity. Additionally, 18 counties were operating under court-ordered population caps for at least one jail in their county. To address these capacity constraints, counties released 7,050 pre-sentenced inmates and 5,700 sentenced inmates in September 2012, up by 410 and 2,119 inmates, respectively, from September 2011.

Conclusion

In the middle of Skid Row sits the Central Community Police Station, a non-descript beige building that would not be easily identified as a police station if it wasn't for the constant stream of officers coming in and out of the building. The other thing that separates this building from others in Skid Row, is the lack of Skid Row residents loitering in front of it like nearly every other building in this community. Through my discussions with Skid Row residents the fact that this building has been here for nearly forty years is rarely mentioned. Law enforcement has been pivotal in the construction of Skid Row, as the main supplier and remover of homeless bodies. Through my interviews with resident in appears that police presence in Skid Row

correspondence with the influx of new real estate development. With this building serving as a type of panopticon of downtown Los Angeles, this chapter set out to analyze the impact law enforcement and the historical policies linked to it, has shaped Skid Row.

In this chapter we observed the historical construction of homeless criminality. The demographics of skid row and how skid row is viewed as a space of homelessness is connected to larger institutions of mental health and law enforcement. The historical connection between these two types of institutions is rarely discussed but skid row provides us an access point in discovering how policies of mental health have impacted the proliferation and now reformation of California's correctional institutions.

We first explored the landmark Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which nearly abolished involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill individuals. This act had the result of the closures of many of the state's mental facilities. This act had two major impacts. The first is that many of these individuals whom were released for these hospitals were arrested for minor criminal acts and placed in correctional facilities. The second, is the creation of psychiatric ghettos. These ghettos can be defined as a collection of poorly maintained housing units for now displaced mental patients, in run-down buildings, maintained by private companies and individuals. Skid row being one of these spaces. Psychiatric ghettos sprung up in declining residential and tourist areas in boarding homes that were formerly tourist-based hotels that had become dilapidated.

This increase of these ghettos and increase in media representations of crime and drug use in urban areas created a fear of urban spaces for white middle class populations. To combat this urban blight, tough on crime rhetoric and policies emerged, with the eventual passing of proposition 184 being tool used to defeat this war crime. This lead to an increase of the prison population. As felons were released from prisons, they had limited places to. Skid Row was a

space to find services for this population. Skid Row became a part of the now cyclical law enforcement process.

From this historical process as we begin to see how Skid Row emerged as a site for increased law enforcement activity. As development and gentrification increased in downtown LA the huge homeless population of adjacent Skid Row represented a barrier. What's the hiring of LAPD Chief Bratton, Skid Row immediately became a space to deal with crime and the development of an economic and cultural space in downtown Los Angeles. This chapter looks at Bratton's use Broken Window Theory as a strategy to prevent social unrest and crime. Homelessness and homeless practices became the focus of the LAPD's new strategy. I argue that the broken windows strategy developed by Bratton during this time period created a space in which the practices and existence of the homeless population of Skid Row were deemed as criminal. Utilizing the work of Alison Mountz, I argue that Skid Row becomes space of criminality that represents the denial basic rights of citizenship.

With passage of AB 109 and proposition 47, the framework of overcrowding and subpar conditions has been replaced by a narrative of increased local control and support. The prisons and Skid Row have historically been the sites where deinstitutionalized populations were placed; to be poor or mentally ill in California also meant to be criminal. What happens to this vulnerable population when public calls for the state to "do something" are never meant to increase services but safety?

Even with a discourse of prison depopulation, the practices of the homeless community are still considered criminal and, in many states, are becoming subject to increasing criminality. As urban centers continue to shift into cultural production, and with the incessant wooing of

specific white bodies to reoccupy cities becoming the defining practice of modern local urban

governments, the homeless body and poor body are barriers to this progress.